A Survey on the Washington Consensus and the Beijing Model: Reconciling Development Perspectives by Asongu, Simplice & Acha-Anyi, Paul
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
A Survey on the Washington Consensus
and the Beijing Model: Reconciling
Development Perspectives
Asongu, Simplice and Acha-Anyi, Paul
January 2019
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/101533/
MPRA Paper No. 101533, posted 04 Jul 2020 06:41 UTC
1 
 
 
A G D I   Working Paper 
 
 
WP/19/050 
 
 
A Survey on the Washington Consensus and the Beijing Model: Reconciling 
Development Perspectives 
 
 
Forthcoming: International Review of Economics 
 
 
Simplice A. Asongu 
African Governance and Development Institute, 
P. O. Box 8413, Yaoundé, Cameroon  
E-mails: asongusimplice@yahoo.com  
/ asongus@afridev.org  
 
 
Paul N. Acha-Anyi  
Department of Tourism, Hospitality and Sports Management 
Buffalo City, College street campus,  
Walter Sisulu University 
Eastern Cape Province, South Africa  
E-mails: pacha-anyi@wsu.ac.za / 
                achasinstitute@gmail.com 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
2019   African Governance and Development Institute                               WP/19/050 
   
 
Research Department 
 
 
A Survey on the Washington Consensus and the Beijing Model: Reconciling 
Development Perspectives  
 
 
Simplice A. Asongu &   Paul N. Acha-Anyi  
 
  
January 2019 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Reconciling the two dominant development models of the Washington Consensus (WC) and 
Beijing Model (BM) remains a critical challenge in the literature.  The challenge is even more 
demanding when emerging development paradigms like the Liberal Institutional Pluralism 
(LIP) and New Structural Economics (NSE) schools have to be integrated. While the latter 
has recognized both State and market failures but failed to provide a unified theory, the 
former has left the challenging concern of how institutional diversity matter in the 
development process. We synthesize perspectives from recently published papers on 
development and Sino-African relations in order to present the relevance of both the WC and 
BM in the long-term and short-run respectively. While the paper postulates for a unified 
theory by reconciling the WC and the BM to complement the NSE, it at the same time 
presents a case for economic rights and political rights as short-run and long-run development 
priorities respectively. By attempting to reconcile the WC with the BM, the study contributes 
at the same to macroeconomic NSE literature of unifying a development theory and to the LIP 
literature on institutional preferences with stages of development. Hence, the proposed 
reconciliation takes into account the structural and institutional realities of nations at different 
stages of the process of development. 
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1. Introduction 
The success and burgeoning economic prosperity of China over the past decades has 
led to growing debates in academic and policy making circles over the relevance of the 
Washington Consensus  (WC) in 21st century development (Asongu et al., 2018)1. Narratives 
have varied from, inter alia: lost decades with the WC (Fofack, 2014); the Beijing Model 
(BM) more adapted to the 21st century (Nijs, 2008; Huang, 2010); development strategies 
based on a mixture of the WC and other successful development strategies (Fosu, 2013a); 
preferences in economic versus political rights in a development approach (Moyo, 2013); 
while institutions promote economic growth (Acemoglu et al., 2015, 2017), institutions could 
be more endogenous to economic prosperity in Africa (Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 2014) and; 
scale of preference in rights between developing and developed countries in the era of 
globalization (Lalountas et al., 2011; Asongu, 2014a).   
The debates have largely erupted because a strand of authors maintains that the poor 
performance of some developing countries is traceable to the WC (Fofack, 2014, p. 6). The 
WC that is based on government failures includes policies of marketisation, privitisation and 
liberalization (inter alia), while the BM is based on government regulation and prudence in 
liberalization and privatization (Nijs, 2008). Akomolafe (2008) has suggested that developing 
countries should stop looking at the West for instructions because China which is now 
prospering at breath-taking pace was in a similar economic stalemate as most African 
countries about five decades ago. However, while it opted to recourse to internal solutions to 
address its economic issues, Africa decided to follow prescriptions from the WC. The 
disappointment in development has led to growing distrust in Western policies, coupled with 
amongst others: colonialism, slavery, manipulations during the Cold war, corruption by 
companies from the West and, neocolonialism (Robinson, 2009). Moreover, the relevance of 
this study is also consolidated by the recent international financial crisis, the launching of the 
New Development Bank as well as the Belt and Road Initiative which are contributing 
towards rethinking and reshaping the global architecture of international cooperation and 
governance (Das, 2008; Garnaut et al., 2009; Huang, 2016).   
China has responded to the above growing frustrations by carefully tailoring its 
foreign policy to reflect opposite feelings. China’s unconditional and non-interference 
approach is igniting a lot of interest in the tendencies of Sino-African relations (Taylor, 2006; 
Asche et al., 2008; Besada et al., 2008; Biggeri et al., 2009; Ortmann, 2012).  Moreover the 
                                                 
1
 The terms models and paradigms are used interchangeably throughout the study.  
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Chinese model has some elements that are not consistent with the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (Asongu et al., 2018).  
The present study complements existing literature by putting some structure on views 
and agenda for an African development consensus. It presents the existing African consensus 
or New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in light of growing narratives; 
discusses the Washington consensus and Beijing consensus as development models; present 
arguments and schools of thought. The resulting agenda consists of: establishing 
complementarities based on recent narratives in the literature; reconciling schools of thoughts 
and; reflecting the Moyo (2013) conjecture on underlying assumptions from Piketty (2014) 
and Kuznets (1955). This main agenda centers on tailoring an African consensus from the 
underlying narratives, inter alia, the: WC, BM, Moyo conjecture, NEPAD, schools of thought 
and emerging development paradigms such as the New Structural Economics and Liberal 
Institutional Pluralism. While the New Structural Economics has recognized both State and 
market failures but failed to provide a unified theory, the Liberal Institutional Pluralism has 
left the challenging concern of how institutional diversity matter in the development process. 
These post-Washington Consensus schools are relevant to the positioning of the study 
because they articulate a contemporary era of multi-polar development models. How the 
attempt to reconcile the schools of thought and paradigms improve the knowledge about 
Africa’s development is provided in Section 3. 
Reconciling the two dominant models of development (i.e. the WC and BM) remains a 
critical challenge in the literature. Hence, by presenting views of and challenges for their 
reconciliation, the study substantially departs from the extant Sino-African development 
literature which has largely focused on presenting policy syndromes, schools of thought and 
debunking the myths surrounding the nexus. Moreover, the literature on the asymmetric Sino-
African relationship has been substantially documented (Alden, 2006; Askouri, 2007; 
Giovannetti & Sanfilippo,  2009; Elu & Price, 2010).  
This bulk of literature has presented, among others: the short-term positive effects of 
the nexus (Duclos, 2011); decisions of investments that are based on resource-motivations 
and poor governance (Renard, 2011; Kolstad & Wiig, 2011; De Grauwe et al., 2012); the 
need for multi-polar development strategies (Tull, 2006); push and pull factors motivating 
Chinese investments (Biggeri & Sanfilippo, 2009); hard political views of the nexus (Taylor, 
2007); identification and explanation of the West’s evolving suspicion of the nexus (Huliaras 
& Magliveras, 2008); debunking myths surrounding the nexus (Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013) 
5 
 
and suggesting strategies and solutions to the documented policy syndromes (Asongu & 
Ssozi, 2016). 
In light of the above, this study is a response to the need for building 
complementarities between the WC and the BM. This is essentially because the WC 
prescriptions to African countries during the past 30 years have largely not delivered on the 
promises (Bartels et al., 2009; Tuomi, 2011; Asongu, 2012; Darley, 2012). Hence, it is 
politically correct for China to use this frustration as an instrument in its foreign policy.   
The present study which focuses on the complementarity between the WC and BM 
also departs from documented African-oriented development models. These include: the 
Africa’s Priority for Economic Recovery (APPER, 1986-1990); the Lagos Plan of Action for 
Economic Development (LPA, 1980-200); the African Charter for Popular Participation for 
Development (1990); the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment 
Programme for Socioeconomic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP, 1989); the 2001 
NEPAD (OAU, 1980, 2001; Adedeji, 2002; Bujra, 2004); more self-reliance by African 
countries for better development (Fofack, 2014) and a stream of studies on development 
strategies covered by Fosu (2013a).  
In the light of the above, this study contributes to the extant literature in the following 
ways: definition of the WC and the BM; reconciliation of dominant development models in 
the short-term and long-term and postulation of a unified theory of economic development. 
The paper postulates a unified theory that reconciles the WC and the BM and also presents a 
case for economic rights and political rights as short-run and long-run development priorities, 
respectively2. The rest of the study is presented as follows. The views are presented in Section 
2. Section 3 discusses the resulting agenda while Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Views on multi-polar development strategies  
Over the past decades, much has been documented on the causes of poor economic 
development in Africa (Englebert, 2002; Jerven, 2011; Kodila-Tedika & Agbor, 2014; 
Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2017). Some of the reasons from the attendant literature include: 
social setbacks to technological improvements and economic prosperity according to 
Amavilah  (2015). Amavilah (2014, 2006) and Lewis (1955) have focused on the loss of 
traditional institutions in the continent while Nunn (2008, 2009) and Nunn and Puga (2012) 
                                                 
2
 The narratives on long term do not imply that long term propositions should be postponed. Hence, the 
narratives about comparative priority should not be construed as postponing long term propositions. This is 
essentially because while it takes democracies long term to mature and be effective, democracy is practiced in 
the short term and medium terms. 
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have established that deinstitutionalization is a fundamental cause of the poverty tragedy in 
Africa. According to Amavilah (2015), the absence of an apparent distinction between 
“private use rights” and “private property rights” also explains the underdevelopment issues 
experienced by the continent. Other documented factors are: undervaluation of local 
knowledge in comparison to foreign knowledge (Brush & Stabinsky, 1996; Lwoga et al., 
2010;  Raseroka, 2008; Tchamyou, 2017; Amavilah et al., 2017); low exploration and 
exploitation of natural resources (Doftman, 1939; Lewis, 1955; Amavilah, 2014); the 
inaccurate economics based on preconditions (Monga, 2014) as well as unfavorable 
ramifications of colonization (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013); inability of governments to 
acknowledge that resources are scarce (Dorfman, 1939; Lewis, 1955; Lucas, 1993; America, 
2013; Looney, 2013; Drine, 2013) and excessive purchase of luxury commodities by 
government officials (Adewole & Osabuohien, 2007; Efobi et al., 2013). Lin (2015), Asongu 
and Ssozi (2016) and Asongu and le Roux, (2019) have been concerned with lost decades in 
the light of prescribed policies from the Washington Consensus while another stream of 
authors has attributed the comparatively low level of economic development in Africa to the 
continent’s over-reliance on foreign aid as well as the ineffectiveness of African governments 
to negotiate favorable terms of receiving foreign aid (Moyo, 2009; Obeng-Odoom, 2013; 
Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2001). 
 
2.1 Dominant development models 
 We discuss this section in three main strands: from the ‘Washington Consensus’ to the 
“Beijing Model” through insights into “Liberal Institutional Pluralism and New Structural 
Economics”. It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss the big ideas in the history of 
African development which have been highlighted in the introduction. What is important to 
note for the interest of this study is that, over three decades of a neoliberal experiment in the 
continent has failed to deliver. Accordingly, the continent’s contribution to global trade has 
dropped to under 1.5% from above 3.8% in the 1950s (Fofack, 2014; Asongu & Tchamyou, 
2018)3. While some have labeled the neoliberal experiment as lost decades (Mkandawire, 
2004, 2015), others have been more radical in qualifying it as the 20th century economic 
                                                 
3
 It is important to note that a drop in the participation of Africa in global trade is not the only evidence of the 
poor macroeconomic performance of many African development strategies. For instances, according to Fosu 
(2013b), some of the conditions for the unfavorable economic performance of African countries are:  
 “administered redistribution”, “state breakdown”, “state controls”, and “suboptimal inter temporal resource 
allocation”.  Asongu (2017a, 2017b) associate the poor performance to comparatively low levels of knowledge 
economy while Tchamyou (2019a, 2019b) consider inequality as a fundamental policy syndrome.  
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tragedy (Artadi & Sala-i-Martin, 2003). Some accounts have been more proverbial in stating 
that, whereas Arthur Lewis (1955) led all developing nations to water, many African 
countries simply refused to drink (Amavilah, 2014). These narratives are consistent with the 
World Bank’s (2011) position that the only region in the developing world to miss the 
Millennium Development Goal (MDG) extreme poverty target is Africa (Fofack, 2014). Post-
2015 African-centric literature has confirmed the World Bank’s projections that closed to 
50% of countries in Africa did not achieve the MDG extreme poverty target (Bicaba et al., 
2017; Efobi et al., 2018; Tchamyou et al., 2019). In light of the above setbacks, scholars have 
been searching for useful and evidence-based processes of development. Consequently, two 
new leading paradigms of development that have emerged are: the “New Structural 
Economics” (NSE) and the “Liberal Institutional Pluralism” (LIP). 
The LIP that focuses on institutions, norms and rules limiting human behavior has 
been put forward by Brett (2009), Rodrik (2008), Acemoglu et al. (2005) and North (2009). 
From a macroeconomic perspective, the consistency by these authors is tailored towards 
institutional conditions needed for political transformation and economic prosperity. The 
central element of the thesis assumes that two factors affect the economic growth of nations: 
the society’s ability to resolve agency problems and, the capacity of institutions to manage 
individuals’ predation. This paradigm received prominence when it was established that long-
term economic prosperity was not independently affected by WC policies, once the quality of 
domestic institutions was taken into account (Easterly & Levine, 2003; Fofack, 2014).  
The NSE that has been presented by: Stiglitz and Lin (2013), Stiglitz et al. (2013a, 
2013b), Norman and Stiglitz (2012), Lin and Monga (2011), and Chang (2002). They 
advocate without necessarily working towards a unified economic development theory, for a 
synthesis of liberalism and structuralism ideology. They have proposed application of an 
economic approach based on neoclassical economics in a bid to understand the determinants 
of economic structure and how their evolution affects development. The synthesis involves 
taking into account both structural characteristics in the understanding of economic 
development and the mission of the government as a driver of infrastructural development, 
integration of markets that are essential for economic prosperity. Hence, this new approach 
has recognized both market and State failures (Fofack, 2014). 
Although it has been criticized in some quarters (Huang, 2010, 2016), the Chinese 
development model which advocates for State regulation and prudence in market openness is 
being recognized as more adapted than the WC to 21st century development (Asongu & 
Aminkeng, 2013). Relative to the WC that favors complete free trade, this alternative 
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development approach puts more emphasis on national sovereignty and prudential market 
reforms (Nijs, 2008; Hlaing & dan Kakinaka, 2018).  Recent Sino-African literature has 
substantially documented the Chinese consensus as a model for African development. Some 
notable studies in this strand of literature include the following perspectives: China 
representing both a new imperialism and a new model of development (Ovadia, 2013); though 
Chinese involvement in the continent is ambivalent and contextual, it offers new avenues of 
African development (Mohan & Power, 2008) and the dependence theory should be 
overlooked for a more comprehensive understanding of the nexus (Ajakaiye & Kaplinsky, 
2009). 
This strand of the literature is consistent with the view that instead of criticizing the 
Beijing model, it should be engaged (Kuo, 2012) because the Sino-African nexus is offering 
new avenues of development that could substantially fight poverty in the continent (Carmody, 
2009). Wu and Cheng (2010) are supportive of the view that  China has special lessons for 
African due to her achievement of poverty mitigation over the past decades and; China is 
bringing substantial transformation to Africa via export of entrepreneurial talent and 
economic dynamism (Friedman, 2009). There is indeed an abundant literature on the 
beneficial nature of Sino-African relations, notably:  the reliance on capital goods from China 
that is positive for sub-Saharan Africa’s (SSA’s) growth (Munemo, 2013); the important role 
of African agencies (Mohan & Lampert, 2010); positive appeals even to resource-poor 
countries (Ancharaz, 2009); a historical and sustainable relationship (Power & Mohan, 2010);  
development of specialized economic zones (Edinger, 2008) and economic diversification and 
mitigation of negative shocks from natural resource specialization (Diaw & Lassoua, 2013).  
The story about China’s move into Africa is not only flowery. While China’s foreign 
assistance to Africa considerably impacts her development goals, the effect depends on 
institutional and structural characteristics (McCormick, 2008). The land grab by Chinese 
would be more beneficial to actors of local communities if their perspectives are taken into 
account in contract negotiations (Buckley, 2013). Kaplinsky and Morris (2009) have 
concluded that SSA needs to formulate policies that increase her benefits in natural resource 
exploitation. Within the same framework, Goldstein et al. (2006) have concluded that though 
the exploitation of resources might benefit the continent, there are unexpected and dramatic 
consequences. In summary, there are both positive and negative effects in Sino-African 
relations. Hence, African leaders should work towards stifling the latter effects that outweigh 
the former (Ademola et al., 2009). This is in line with an earlier conclusion by Edwards 
(2006) that the nexus, depending on nations, could either be negative or positive. Due to 
9 
 
growing narratives emphasizing that more studies are needed to sustain myths surrounding the 
Sino-African relationship (Mohan, 2013), various schools of thought have emerged that merit 
emphasis, namely, the: neocolonial or pessimistic school; Balanced-Development school and 
Accommodation School. These are to the best of our knowledge the main schools of thought 
that can guide the research.  
 
2.2 Schools of thought and arguments  
The neocolonial or pessimistic school has been advanced by pessimists of the China 
model4. These are predominantly advocates of the WC who associate China’s activities (FDI, 
aid and trade) in Africa with resource-seeking ambitions and bad governance. According to 
the narrative, Chinese move into Africa is benefiting China and African elites. Hence, since 
this engagement leaves little or no ladder of opportunities for those in the low-income strata, 
the school maintains that the nexus is not always in the interest of African nations. The 
reference often provided to substantiate this thesis is the African Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA)5 from the USA which is hypothesized to go beyond the making of profits by 
promoting good governance (Clinton, 2011).  
The discourses that sustain the thesis highlight both general and specific conclusions 
which support a pessimistic perspective of Sino-African relations. The research does not 
dissociate general from specific conclusions because the purpose of the narrative is to 
highlight studies that have provided pessimistic conclusions on Sino-African relations. These 
include, amongst others: Southern Africa’s agricultural export sector not positively affected 
by Chinese prosperity (Villoria, 2009); Europe and the USA are increasingly suspicious of the 
Sino-African nexus and are tailoring measures with which to increase their leverage (Huliaras 
& Magliveras, 2008) or the nexus being asymmetric from a Western point of view (Alden, 
2006);  Chinese prostitutes are looked-upon as cheap and junk as commodities from China 
(Ndjio, 2009); Chinese trade is rendering African industries very vulnerable (Giovannetti & 
Sanfilippo, 2009); great discontent by workers in Chinese industries (Brooks, 2010); 
investments from China are destroying some African communities like in Sudan  (Askouri, 
2007) and, driven by the availability of natural resources (Kiggundu, 2008, p. 130). The 
relationship would not be beneficial to Africa because of small productive capacities and low 
degree of diversification (Chemingui & Bchir, 2010) or low levels of industrialization (Power, 
                                                 
4The Beijing model of development advocates national sovereignty, prudence in market reforms and State 
regulation (Nijs, 2008).  
5
 The AGOA provides incentives for African countries to remain consistent with free market policies.  
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2008). Human rights violations could be exported to Africa (Brselin & Taylor, 2008; Zhou, 
2005) and the nexus may not lead to higher living standards in SSA (Elu & Price, 2010) 
broadly because of myths surrounding it (Freschi, 2010; De Grauwe et al., 2012; Asongu & 
Aminkeng, 2013).  
The Balanced-Development school postulates that contrary to the first school, the 
relationship between China and Africa would be symmetrical if African nations can device 
common policies based on rational economic arguments to balance it (Duclos, 2011). For 
instance, the non-interference policy endows governments in the continent with the leverage 
of consolidating their sovereignty in mutual projects. Three points are central to elucidating 
this school. First, the Chinese foreign policy of unconditional foreign aid greatly deviates 
from the Western version which patronizes African countries (Tull, 2006). In this light, the 
term “colonialism” used by the pessimistic school to qualify Sino-African relations is very 
misplaced (Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013; Asongu et al., 2018). The basis for such 
misplacement is that the employment of trade and investment as instruments for influencing 
processes of decision-making in African countries by certain developed countries is similar to 
some form of neocolonialism.  Second, based on the evidence that most African nations and 
China had relatively similar economic issues in the 1960s and 1970s, Africa can benefit a lot 
from China because her breath-taking economic prosperity is largely traceable to her choice 
of independently charting her own development course instead of taking prescriptions from 
the WC. Third, from the perspectives of non-interferences and unconditionality, Chinese 
foreign policy is in accordance with the NEPAD’s perspective of African ownership (Asongu 
& Aminkeng, 2013). There is a substantial body of recent literature substantiating this second 
school (McCormick, 2008; Diaw & Lassoua, 2013; Carmody & Owusu, 2007; Wu & Cheng, 
2010).  
The third stream which is the Accommodation School emphasises that the issue in the 
classification of schools should not be centred on whether China has colonial ambitions or 
not. According to the narrative, it should be oriented towards whether Africa has other 
substantial alternatives beside the predominant West and China (De Grauwe et al., 2012). 
Hence, the two thoughts motivating this school are the following: (i) the dominant models 
presented to Africa are the WC and BM and (ii) Western nations are no “less neo-colonialist” 
compared to China (Asongu, 2016; Asongu & Ssozi, 2016). According to this strand, China is 
using the same rules of free market competition established by the WC which with respect to 
most accounts have failed to deliver in Africa (Bartels et al., 2009; Asongu, 2012; Tuomi, 
2011; Darley, 2012). Hence, the exploitation of Africa’s suspicion some Western double 
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standards by China to further her footprint into the continent is politically correct (Asongu et 
al., 2018). The bulk of literature sustaining this school of thought include, inter alia: 
Drogendijk and Blomkvist (2013), Wissenbach (2009) and Ovadia (2013).  
 
3. Agenda: An African Consensus in the Beijing Model and the Washington Consensus 
 Consistent with Asongu et al. (2018), the NEPAD which to this day is acknowledged 
as the mainstream African consensus may be interpreted to integrate both the BM and the 
WC. According to the narrative, the NEPAD represents a degree of consensus among African 
countries that are seriously working towards the advancement of the continent. In essence, it 
is in line with the WC because values of good governance, human rights and democracy are 
clearly stipulated in its charter. Along the same lines, the Chinese policy of non-interference 
seriously compromises efforts by bodies such as the African Union to sustain and enforce this 
dimension of the NEPAD policies. Therefore, the Chinese policy indirectly endows less 
democratic governments with the leverage to promote bad governance and corruption (among 
others) which do not constitute some of the core values shared by the NEPAD. On the other 
hand, the non-interference and “unconditionality” policies by China are consistent with the 
NEPADs understanding of African sovereignty. Hence, while China in principle treats 
African countries as equal and sovereign partners; this is not the case with some Western 
nations. Two examples include: the USA’s policy in Saudi Arabia that is similar to China’s 
foreign policy and, France’s foreign policy in Africa which has not been characterized by her 
cherished values of equality, fraternity and liberty (Taylor, 2006; Asongu & Ssozi, 2016). 
Therefore, based on the above, African countries can leverage on both the WC and the BM. 
This underlines the relevance of building complementarities.  
 
3.1 Building complementarities  
 Before reconciling schools of thoughts, argument and paradigms, it is relevant to first 
of all support the need for building complementarities between the WC and BM (Asongu, 
2016). There is a growing body of literature supporting this need, notably:  an imperative of 
building complementarities among traditional development partners, China and Africa 
(Schiere, 2010);  companies from China almost have similar motivations as corporations from 
the West (Drogendijk & Blomkvist, 2013), especially in terms of FDI (Lin & Farrell, 2013; 
Kolstad & Wiig, 2011), experiences in two Zambian sectors (Kragelund, 2009), general 
resource- and market-seeking interests (Zhang et al., 2013;  Gu, 2009; Osei & Mubiru, 2010)  
and compliance with free-market competition standards (Mohan & Tan-Mullins, 2009;  
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Kamwanga & Koyi, 2009). In summary, the narrative sustains that the Sino-African nexus is 
an ineluctable process with a sound historical evolution (Alden & Alves, 2008) that requires 
some cooperation from traditional development partners for more mutual benefits 
(Wissenbach, 2009). A cooperation that would potentially dissipate growing ambivalence on 
new opportunities for the development of Africa (Mohan & Power, 2008). 
 
3.2 Reconciling schools of thought and paradigms  
 In this section, we shall first reconcile the schools of thought documented above, with 
particular emphasis on: the two dominant models of development and the Moyo conjecture. 
Then we shall discuss how this reconciliation also reconciles the Liberal institutional 
pluralism (LIP) and New Structural economics (NSE) paradigms in the second sub-section. A 
synthesis that at the same time fills some gaps left in the LIP and NSE literature.  
 
3.2.1 Reconciling schools of thought  
 We engage this sub-section in three main strands: emphasis on preference in rights 
(human versus (vs) national, idiosyncratic vs sovereign and, political vs economic); linkages 
between, thesis, anti-thesis, synthesis, schools of thoughts and, dominant development models 
and; use of the Moyo conjecture to reconcile the BM and the WC.  
 The first strand discusses concerns on preferences of rights that are the central 
arguments distinguishing the first-two schools. These include human rights vs national rights 
(Taylor, 2006), idiosyncratic rights vs sovereign rights (Asongu & Aminkeng, 2014) and; 
political rights vs economic rights (Lalountas et al., 2011; Moyo, 2013; Asongu, 2014a). 
Whereas the second sets of rights are consistent with the second school, the first sets dominate 
narratives of the first school. In essence, the neocolonial or pessimistic or first school in its 
condemnation of the Chinese foreign policy in Africa broadly prefers human rights over 
national rights, idiosyncratic rights over sovereign rights and political rights over economic 
rights. In the same vein, the balanced development or second school which maintains that the 
Chinese model is valuable for Africa prefers: national rights over human rights, sovereign 
rights over idiosyncratic rights and economic rights over political rights.  
First of all, in China’s foreign policy, national rights precede human rights. As we 
have discussed above, Africa in increasingly discontent about the West’s selective definition 
of human of rights. The suspension of foreign aid to Uganda for exercising her national rights 
to pass an anti-gay bill through the democratic process is a case in point (Asongu, 2014b).  
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   Second, individual or idiosyncratic rights do not also precede sovereignty rights in 
the Chinese perspective (Taylor, 2006). Given that African nations have been increasingly 
humiliated by issues of hegemony, the Chinese perspective is that by standards of 
international law, sovereign nations should not criticize other sovereign countries on issues 
that are supported by democratic processes at the domestic level. The narrative should be 
balanced with the fact that while China in principle advocates for non-interference, there are 
growing critiques that China is not living-up to this standard of non-interference (Gonzalez-
Vicente, 2015). 
Third, as concerns preferences between ‘voting rights’ and ‘the right to food’ which 
have been the issues of heated debates in a recent stream of studies (Moyo, 2013; Asongu, 
2016), there is a growing consensus that political rights or institutions are more endogenous to 
productive structures, economic prosperity or economic rights  (Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 
2014).  
   In the second strand, as previously discussed, the schools of thought documented 
above can be further classified into the following. The first, pessimistic or neocolonial school 
which could also be known as the thesis typically sustains the priority of political rights or the 
Washington consensus. The second or balanced-development school which could also be 
qualified as an anti-thesis to the first school largely advocates for a Beijing model or priority 
in economic rights. Lastly, the third or accommodation school could also be viewed as a 
synthesis suggesting a reconciliation of the WC and the BM.  
 The third strand largely focuses on discussions over whether economic rights or 
political rights should come first in the development process. The debate has been reconciled 
into what we term as the Moyo (2013) conjecture. While Moyo defines the WC as “private 
capitalism, liberal democracy and priority in political rights”, she has also defined the BM as 
“state capitalism, deemphasized democracy and priority in economic rights”. Whereas, 
political rights priorities are largely the focus of the first school of thought, economic rights 
are the central element in the second school. The Moyo conjecture maintains that economic 
rights or the BM should be prioritized in the short-run whereas political rights or the WC 
should be prioritized in the long-term.  
 The intuition for the conjecture is that, a sustainable middle class is needed to demand 
political rights in a sustainable manner (Asongu, 2016; Kodila-Tedika et al., 2016). Hence, 
once a burgeoning middle class has been established, the population would automatically 
demand political rights that would not be tainted by “crony democracy”. This is essentially 
because, this class would no longer be concerned about basic economic rights (of shelter and 
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food) which are largely issues of low-income groups. Since the BM has proven to deliver a 
burgeoning middle class within a relatively shorter interval relative to the WC, it is suggested 
by the conjecture to be the better short term model.  Asongu (2014a) and Lalountas et al. 
(2011) have broadly confirmed this conjecture in African and developing countries, 
respectively.  
 It is important to devote more space to clarifying the stated sequence of importance in 
institutions because it is a very strong proposition. The intuition for this sequence is that 
economic institutions are more relevant than political institutions at the early stages of 
industrialization. Economic institutions promote the economic rights of citizens, which 
include, among others: the rights to shelter, clothing, sanitation and health. On the other hand, 
political institutions are concerned with the election and replacement of political leaders or the 
rights to vote. Many accounts maintain that the electorates in many African countries are 
ready to follow any leadership that purchases their votes with a few dollars essential for basic 
economic needs (Kramon, 2009). Hence, it is reasonable to infer that political rights are more 
endogenous to economic rights at the early stages of economic development. The narrative is 
consistent with the conclusions of Lalountas et al. (2011) and Asongu (2014a) which sustain 
that, more emphasis is placed on the political (economic) dimension of globalization in high 
(low) income countries.  
 
3.2.2 Reconciling paradigms and agenda  
 The section addresses two main concerns. On the one hand, how the Moyo conjecture 
reconciles the Liberal Institutional Pluralism (LIP) and New Structural Economics (NSE) 
schools and, on the other hand, how the conjecture bridges some gaps left by the two 
emerging paradigms in the literature. On this latter contribution of the conjecture, two points 
are worth emphasizing. First, it complements the LIP school by providing an institutional 
design of development. Accordingly, the Moyo conjecture clearly articulates what institutions 
are needed for what stages of development. While economic institutions are more important at 
the early stages of industrialization, political institutions become more relevant as the 
economy emerges and transits to a high income nation. Second, the NSE school is 
complemented by the conjecture in providing a unified theory that incorporates both State and 
market failures. Accordingly, while the BM proposed as a short-run development model 
favors State regulation and prudence in economic openness, the WC suggested for the long-
term reflects quite the opposite. On the former contribution, the proposed conjecture is such 
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that, the institutional design for economic development is specifically reflected in the short-
term and long-run models respectively.  
 We devote space to discussing how the conjecture relates to the NSE in subtle detail. 
As substantiated by Fofack (2014), an interesting challenge in the NSE (Acemoglu et al., 
2005) is the absence of a causal linkage between a specific institutional design and economic 
prosperity. The conjecture addresses this concern by establishing that political (economic) 
institutions are more relevant at the later (early) stages of industrialization. This contribution 
also deviates from the fundamental one-size fits all frameworks that fail to take into account 
structural needs at each stage of the development process. Hence, the conjecture takes into 
account local conditions before recommending policy tools. For instance, the right to food is 
more relevant than the right to vote in low income countries6. In a continent where poverty is 
substantially linked with huge capital flight (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2008, 2011; Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2016, 2017; Efobi & Asongu, 2016; Asongu & Amankwah-Amoah, 2017; 
Asongu, 2014b), the priority of infrastructural provision by the African Development Bank 
broadly substantiates the conjecture. 
 A fundamental assumption of the Moyo conjecture is that the WC is more sustainable 
than the BM because inequality has increased more with the BM than with the WC. Hence, 
according to the idea, the WC is more inclusive than the BM. But the relevance of this 
paradigm has two main shortcomings. First,  Piketty (2014) has debunked the Kuznets (1955) 
inverted u-shaped relationship between industrialization and inequality which is an underlying 
assumption of the conjecture. Second, even without Piketty (2014), based on an exclusive 
Kuznets’ perspective, inequality in China would fall with the evolution of industrialization. 
Addressing these two highlighted issues is an interesting agenda for further research.  
 
4. Concluding implications, caveats and future research directions   
 There is an evolving stream of literature on the false economics of preconditions for 
policy-making in the African context (Monga, 2014). There is also a growing paradigm shift 
from the previously dominant Washington Consensus (WC) to multi-polar development 
strategies which include the Beijing Model (BM). A recent example illustrating this shift  
from the WC is a consensus by the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China & South Africa) 
                                                 
6
 It is important to balance this narrative with the relevant critique by Sen (1999) about free press and democratic 
processes that would address the risk of famine, especially in contrast with the Chinese experience. Sen’s 
position also contrasts with Moyo (2018) who advocates that democracy is failing to deliver economic 
development.  
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nations on the 15th of July 2014 which resulted in the creation of a New Development Bank 
(NDB) to complement mainstream financial institutions advancing the agenda of the WC 
(Khanna, 2014; Griffith-Jones, 2014).  
Reconciling the two dominant development models of the WC and BM remains a 
critical challenge in the literature.  The challenge is even more demanding when emerging 
development paradigms like the Liberal Institutional Pluralism (LIP) and New Structural 
Economics (NSE) schools have to be integrated. While the latter has recognized both State 
and market failures but failed to provide a unified theory, the former has left the challenging 
concern of how institutional diversity affects the development process. We synthesize 
perspectives from recently published papers on development and Sino-African relations in 
order to present the relevance of both the WC and BM in the long-term and short run, 
respectively. While the paper postulates for a unified theory by reconciling the WC and the 
BM to complement the NSE, it at the same time presents a case for economic rights and 
political rights as short-run and long-run development priorities, respectively. By attempting 
to reconcile the WC with the BM, the study contributes at the same to macroeconomic NSE 
literature of unifying a development theory and to the LIP literature on institutional 
preferences with stages of development. Hence, the proposed reconciliation takes into account 
the structural and institutional realities of nations at different stages of the process of 
development. 
 It is also relevant to acknowledge that changes recently brought about by Donald 
Trump in the foreign economic policy of the United States of America (USA) within the 
framework of a trade war has considerably affected the power balance between the WC and 
the BM because it is likely to push China to further consolidate its Sino-African relations in 
the hope of compensating for lost market shares in the USA. This contemporary perspective 
on a trade war, along with the establishment of the New Development Bank in 2014 should be 
considered in future studies in view of further clarifying contemporary Sino-African relations.  
The exposition has a broad focus and it is essential to clearly articulate sub-themes of 
the underlying study in future papers. However, it is important to note that this study is 
positioned as a broad reflection of “views and agenda” from which other lines of inquiry 
would emerge. Therefore, future studies can extend this study by expanding on various 
strands of thought covered. 
 While criticisms can arise on the difficulty of reconciling the schools of thought given 
that their premises are different, it is worthwhile to note that the LIP and NSE are used in a 
minimalist approach. For instance, the LIP is used to articulate the perspective that African 
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countries can priorities different types of institutions in the long run and short term while the 
NSE is used to articulate government-led policies versus market-led economic policies. 
Government-led institutions and economic governance are prioritized by the BM while the 
market-led institutions and political governance are prioritized by the WC. Moreover, 
whereas conceptions of the LIP and NSE can be broader than considered in the study, the 
minimalist contextualization of both schools within the framework of WC versus BM is 
sound. 
 In the light of the above, while the study acknowledges the limits of attempting to 
reconcile various strands of the debate, the paper however offers the basis for future studies in 
advancing the debate, especially in relation to the fact that they are foreign models of 
development based on the West and China interests in Africa. Hence, an African-based 
sociology (or model) of development is not taken into account in the study because as 
clarified in the introduction, the study largely focuses on dominant paradigms and models. 
Addressing these caveats in future studies will require empirical and comparative analyses 
based on macroeconomic and microeconomic data in order to advance scholarship on Sino-
African relations.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
References  
 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J., (2005). “Institutions as a Fundamental 
Cause of Long-Run Growth”. In Handbook of Economic Growth, Vol. 1, Part A. North 
Holland: Elsevier. 
 
Acemoglu, D., Naidu, S., Restrepo, P., & Robinson, J. A., (2019). “Democracy does cause 
growth”, Journal of Political Economy, 127(1), pp. 47-100.  
 
Adedeji, A., (1999). “Structural Adjustment Policies in Africa”. International Social Science 
Journal, 51(162), pp. 521-28. 
Adekunle, B., & Gitau, C. M. W., (2013). “Illusion or Reality: Understanding the Flow 
Between China and Sub-Saharan Africa”, Journal of African Business, 14(2), pp. 117-126.  
 
Ademola, O. T., Bankole, A. S., & Odewuyi, A. O., (2009). “China-Africa Trade Relations: 
Insights from AERC Scoping Studies”, The European Journal of Development Research, 
21(4), pp. 485-505. 
 
Adewole, M. A., & Osabuohien, E. S., (2007). “Analysis of Cost of Governance and Its 
Reduction Options in Nigeria”, Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, 49(1), 
pp.137-159. 
 
Ajakaiye, O., & Kaplinsky, R., (2009). “China in Africa:  A Relationship in Transition”, 
European Journal of Development Research, 21(4), pp. 479-484.  
 
Akomolafe, F., (2008). “No one is laughing at the Asians anymore: Femi Akomolafe on the 
lessons Africa can learn from China: Stop listening to the West and your economic dreams 
will come true”, New Africa.  
 
Alden, C., (2006). “China in Africa”, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 47(3), pp. 
147-164.  
 
Alden, C., & Alves, C., (2008). “History & Identity in the Construction of China's Africa 
Policy”, Review of African Political Economy, 35(115), pp. 43-58.  
 
Alden, C., Large, D., & Soares de Oliveira, R., (Eds.) (2008). China returns to Africa: A 
superpower and a continent embrace. London: Hurst. 
 
Alves, P., (2006). Engaging Asia’s Biggest Tiger: Exploring the contours of a SACU-China 
trade deal. Trade Policy Report No. 14, South African Institute of International Affairs, 
Johannesburg.  
 
Amavilah, V. H., (2014). “Sir W. Arthur Lewis and the Africans: Overlooked economic 
growth lessons”, MPRA Paper No. 57126.  
 
Amavilah, V. H., (2015). “Social Obstacles to Technology, Technological Change, and the 
Economic Growth of African Countries: Some Anecdotal Evidence from Economic History”, 
MPRA Paper No. 63273, Munich.  
 
19 
 
Amavilah, V. H., (2006). “Institutional change and economic performance: An off-the-cuff 
comment on Professors Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson’s three 
papers”, Glendale College, United States.  
 
Amavilah, V. H., Asongu, S. A., & Andrés, A. R., (2017). “Effects of globalization on peace 
and stability: Implications for governance and the knowledge economy of African countries”, 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 122(September), pp. 91-103. 
 
Ancharaz, V., (2009). “David V. Goliath: Mauritius Facing Up to China”, European Journal 
of Development Research, 21(4), pp. 622-643.   
 
Anyanwu, J.,  & Erhijakpor, A. E. O., (2014). “Does Oil Wealth Affect Democracy in 
Africa?”, African Development Review, 26(1), pp.  15-37.  
 
Amavilah, V. H., (2014). “Sir W.  Arthur Lewis and the Africans: Overlooked Economic 
Growth Lessons”, MPRA Paper No. 57126.  
 
America, R., (2013). “Economic Development with Limited Supplies of Management. What 
to do about it – the case of Africa”, Challenge, 56(1), pp. 61-71. 
 
Artadi, E.,  & Sala-i-Martin, X., (2003). “The Economic Tragedy of the 20th Century: Growth 
in Africa”. NBER Working Paper 9865. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
 
Arthur L., (1955). Theory of Economic Growth. Milton Park: Routledge. 
 
Asche, H., &  Schüller, M., (2008). “China’s engagement in Africa: opportunities and risks 
for development”, Africa Department, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit 
(GTZ) GmbH. 
 
Askouri, A., (2007). China’s Investment in Sudan: Displacing Villages and Destroying 
Communities, in Manji and Marks (eds), pp. 71-86.  
 
Asongu, S. A., (2012). “Government Quality Determinants of Stock Market Performance in 
African Countries”, Journal of African Business, 13(3), pp. 183-199.  
 
Asongu, S. A., (2014a). “Globalization (fighting) corruption and development: how are these 
phenomena linearly and nonlinearly related in wealth effects”, Journal of Economic Studies, 
41(3), pp. 346-369. 
 
Asongu, S. A., (2014b). “Fighting African Capital Flight: Empirics on Benchmarking Policy 
Harmonization”, The European Journal of Comparative Economics, 11(2), pp. 93-122.  
 
Asongu, S. A., (2015). “On taxation, political accountability and foreign aid: empirics to a 
celebrated literature”, South African Journal of Economics, 83(2), pp. 180-198. 
 
Asongu, S. A., (2016). “Sino-African relations: a review and reconciliation of dominant 
schools of thought”, Politics & Policy, 44(2), pp. 351–383.  
 
20 
 
Asongu, S. A., (2017a). “Knowledge economy gaps, policy syndromes and catch-up 
strategies: Fresh South Korean lessons to Africa”, Journal of the Knowledge Economy, 8(1), 
pp. 211–253.  
 
Asongu, S. A., (2017b). “The Comparative Economics of Knowledge Economy in Africa: 
Policy Benchmarks, Syndromes, and Implications”, Journal of Knowledge Economy, 8(2), pp. 
596–637. 
 
Asongu, S. A., & Amankwah-Amoah, J., (2017). “Mitigating capital flight through military 
expenditure: Insight from 37 African countries”, Research in International Business and 
Finance, 45(October), pp.  38-53.  
 
Asongu, S. A., & Aminkeng, G. A. A., (2013). “The economic consequences of China-Africa 
relations: debunking myths in the debate”, Journal of Chinese Economic and Business 
Studies,  11(4), pp. 261-277.  
 
Asongu, S. A., & le Roux, S., (2019). “Understanding Sub-Saharan Africa’s Extreme Poverty 
Tragedy”, International Journal of Public Administration, 42(6), pp. 457-467.  
 
Asongu, S. A., & Kodila-Tedika, O., (2017). “Is Poverty in the African DNA (Gene)?”, South 
African Journal of Economics, 85(4), pp. 533–552. 
 
Asongu, S. A., & Nwachukwu, J. C., (2016). “ Rational Asymmetric Development, Piketty 
and Poverty in Africa”, The European Journal of Comparative Economics, 13(2), pp. 221-
246.  
 
Asongu, S. A., & Nwachukwu, J. C., (2017). “Fighting Capital Flight in Africa: Evidence 
from Bundling and Unbundling Governance”, Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 
17(3), pp. 305-323.  
 
Asongu, S. A., Nwachukwu , J. C., & Aminkeng, G. A. A., (2018). “Lessons from a Survey 
of China’s Economic Diplomacy”, Journal of World Trade, 52(5), pp. 789–814. 
 
Asongu, S. A., & Ssozi, J., (2016). “Sino-African relations: some solutions and strategies to 
the policy syndromes”, Journal of African Business, 17(1), pp. 35-51 
 
Asongu, S. A., & Tchamyou, V. S., (2019). “Human Capital, Knowledge Creation, 
Knowledge Diffusion, Institutions and Economic Incentives: South Korea Versus Africa”, 
Contemporary Social Science. DOI: 10.1080/21582041.2018.1457170. 
 
Babatunde, M. A., (2013). “Sino-Africa Investment Relations: The Good, The Bad and The 
Ugly”, Asia Pacific and Globalisation Review, 3(1), pp. 1-23.  
 
Bartels, F. L., Alladina, S. N., & Lederer, S., (2009), “Foreign Direct Investment in Sub-
Saharan Africa: Motivating Factors and Policy Issues”, Journal of African Business, 10(2), 
pp. 141-162. 
 
Besada, H., Wang, Y., & Whalley, J., (2008). “China‘s Growing Economic Activity in 
Africa”, Working Paper 14024, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge. 
 
21 
 
Bicaba, Z., Brixiova, Z., & Ncube, M., (2017). “Can Extreme Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa 
be Eliminated by 2030?,” Journal of African Development, 19(2), pp. 93-110. 
 
Biggeri, M., & Sanfilippo, M., (2009). “Understanding China’s move into Africa: an 
empirical analysis”, Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies,7(1), pp. 31-54. 
 
Boyce J. K., & Ndikumana L., (2008), ‘New Estimate of Capital Flight from Sub-Saharan 
AfricanCountries: Linkages with External Borrowing and Policy Option”, PERI Working 
Paper No. 166, University of Massachusetts Amherst, USA. 
 
Boyce J. K.,&  Ndikumana L. (2011), ‘Capital flight from sub-Saharan Africa: linkages with 
external borrowing and policy options’, International Review of Applied Economics, 25(2), 
149-170. 
 
Brenton, P., & Walkenhorst, P., (2010). “Impact of the Rise of China on Developing Country 
Trade: Evidence from North Africa”, African Development Review, 22(1), pp. 577-586. 
 
Breslin, S., & Taylor, I., (2008). “Explaining the Rise of ‘Human Rights’ in Analyses of Sino-
African Relations”, Review of African Political Economy, 35(115), pp. 59-71. 
 
Brett, E., (2009). Reconstructing Development Theory: International Inequality, Institutional 
Reform andSocial Emancipation. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Brooks, A., (2010). “Spinning and Weaving Discontent: Labour Relations and the Production 
of Meaning at Zambia-China Mulungushi Textiles”, Journal of Southern African Studies, 
36(1), pp. 113-132.  
 
Brush, S. B., & Stabinsky, D., (1996). Valuing Local Knowledge: Indigenous people and 
intellectual property rights. Washington, DC: Island Press. 
 
Buckley, L., (2013). “Chinese Land-Based Interventions in Senegal”, Development and 
Change, 44(2), pp. 429-450.  
 
Bujra, A., (2004). “Pan-African Political and Economic Vision of Development: From OAU 
to the AU, from the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) to the New Partnership for African 
Development (NEPAD)”. DPMF Occasional Paper 13. Addis Ababa: Development Policy 
Management Forum. 
Carmody, P., (2009). “An Asian Driven Economic Recovery in Africa? The Zambian Case”.  
World Development, 37(7), pp. 1197-1207.  
 
Carmody, P., & Owusu, F., (2007). “Chinese vs. America geoeconomic strategies in Africa”, 
Political Geography, Political Geography, 26, pp. 504-524.  
 
Chang, H-J., (2002). Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical 
Perspective.  London: Anthem. 
 
Chemingui, M. A., & Bchir, M. H., (2010). “The Future of African Trade with China under 
Alternative Trade Liberalisation Schemes”, African Development Review, 22(1), pp. 562-576. 
 
22 
 
Clinton, H. R., (2011, June). “Interview on Africa 360”, U.S Department of State, Diplomacy 
in Action http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/06/165941.htm(Accessed on 16/08/2012). 
 
Darley, W. K., (2012), “Increasing Sub-Saharan Africa's Share of Foreign Direct Investment: 
Public Policy Challenges, Strategies, and Implications”, Journal of African Business, 13(1), 
pp. 62-69. 
 
Das, D. K. (2008). “Repositioning the Chinese economy on the global economic stage”. 
International Review of Economics, 55(4), pp. 401-417. 
 
De Grauwe, P., Houssa, R., & Picillo, G., (2012). “African trade dynamics: is China a 
different trading partner? ”,  Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, 10(1), pp. 
15-45.  
 
Diaw, D., & Lessoua, A., (2013). “Natural Resources Exports, Diversification and Economic 
Growth of CEMAC countries: On the Impact of Trade with China”, African Development 
Review, 25(2), pp. 189-202. 
 
Dorfman J., (1939). “Predecessors of Adam Smith: The Growth of British Economic 
Thought. by E. A. J. Johnson”, Political Science Quarterly, 54(1), pp. 103-105.  
 
Drine, I., (2013). “‘Successful’ Development Models: Lessons from the MENA Region”, In 
Achieving Development Success: Strategies and Lessons from the Developing World, ed. 
Fosu, A., Oxford University Press. 
 
Drogendijk, R.,  & Blomkvist, K., (2013). “Drivers and Motives for Chinese Outward Foreign 
Direct Investment in Africa”, Journal of African Business, 14(2), pp. 75-84.  
 
Duclos, V., (2011). “The Rise of China and India in Africa: Challenges, Opportunities and 
Critical Interventions”, Review of African Political Economy, 38(129), pp. 506-507.  
 
Edinger, H., (2008). “China‘s Commercial Relationship with Africa: Evaluating Special 
Economic Zones”, presented at the Institute for West Asian and African Studies (IWAAS), 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China, 15th April 2008. 
 
Efobi, U., & Asongu, S., (2016). “Terrorism and capital flight from Africa”, International 
Economics, 148(December), pp. 81-94.  
 
Efobi, U., Osabuohien, E., & Beecroft, I., (2013), “The Macroeconomic Consequences of the 
Black Sunday in Nigeria”, in Adibe, J. (Ed.), The Politics and Economics of Removing 
Subsidies on Petroleum Products in Nigeria, Adonis & Abbey Publishers, London & Abuja. 
 
Efobi, U. R., Tanaken, B. V., & Asongu, S. A., (2018). “Female Economic Participation with 
25 Information and Communication Technology Advancement: Evidence from Sub‐  Saharan 
Africa”, South African Journal of Economics, 86(2), pp. 231-246. 
 
Englebert, P. (2002). “Solving the mystery of the Africa dummy”, World Development, 
28(10), pp. 1821-1835. 
 
23 
 
Elu, J. U., & Price, G. N., (2010). “Does China Transfer Productivity Enhancing Technology 
to Sub-Saharan Africa? Evidence from Manufacturing Firms”, African Development Review, 
22(1), pp. 587-598.  
 
Fitzgerald, A., (2013). “Why won’t the West call out Saudi Arabia for persecution of 
democratic activists”, The Guardian. 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/dec/29/saudi-arabia-us-human-rights-
persecution-activists (Accessed: 01/08/2014) 
 
Fofack, H., (2014). “The Idea of Economic Development: Views from Africa”, WIDER 
Working Paper 2014/093, Helsinki.  
 
Fosu, A., (2010), “Africa’s Economic Future: Learning from the Past”, CESifo Forum, Info 
Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, 11(1), pp. 62-71.  
 
Fosu, A., (2012), “Development Success: Historical Accounts from More Advanced 
Countries”, UNU-WIDER Research Paper.  
 
Fosu, A., (2013a), “Achieving development success: Strategies and lessons from the 
developing world”, UNU-WIDER Policy Brief (November).  
 
Fosu, A., (2013b). “Growth of African Economies: Productivity, Policy Syndromes and the 
Importance of Institutions”, Journal of African Economies, 22(4), pp. 523–551 
 
Fosu, A. K., (2014). “Growth, Inequality and Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa: Recent Progress 
in a Global Context”,  CSAE Working Paper Series 2014-17.  
 
Freschi, L., (2010). “China in Africa myths and realities”, AIDWATCH  
http://aidwatchers.com/2010/02/china-in-africa-myths-and-realities/ (accessed on: 
01/08/2014). 
 
Friedman, E., (2009). “How Economic Superpower China Could Transform Africa”, Journal 
of Chinese Political Science, 14(1), pp. 1-20.  
 
Garnaut, R., Song, L., & Woo, W. T. (2009). China's new place in a world in crisis: 
Economic, geopolitical and environmental dimensions. ANU E Press. 
 
Gaye, A. (2006). “Chine – Afrique: Le dragon et l’autruche. Essai d’analyse de l’évolution 
contrastée des relations sino-africaines: sainte ou impie alliance du XXIème siècle? ”  
L’Harmattan, Paris. 
 
Giovannetti, G., & Sanfilippo, M., (2009). “Do Chinese Exports Crowd-out African Goods? 
An Econometric Analysis by Country and Sector”, European Journal of Development 
Research, 21(4), pp. 506-530. 
 
Goldstein, A., Pinaud, N., Reisen, H., & Chen, X. (2006). “The rise of China and India: 
What’s in it for Africa? ”. Paris: OECD Development Centre. 
 
24 
 
Gonzalez-Vicente, R., (2015). “The limits to China's non-interference foreign policy: pro-
state interventionism and the rescaling of economic governance”, Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, 69(2), pp. 205-223. 
 
Griffith-Jones, S., (2014). “A Brics Development Bank: A Dream Coming True?”, United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Discussion Paper No. 215.  
 
Gu, J., (2009). “China’s Private Enterprises in Africa and Implications for African 
Development”, European Journal of Development Research Special Issue, 24(4), pp. 570-
587. 
 
Guerroro, D. G., & Manji, F., (2008). China’s new role in Africa and the South: A search for 
a new perspective. Cape Town, Nairobi and Oxford: Fahamu and Focus on the Global South. 
 
Hlaing, S.W., &  dan Kakinaka, M., (2018). “Financial Crisis and Financial Policy Reform: 
Crisis Origins and Policy Dimensions”, European Journal of Political Economy, 
55(December), pp. 224-243.   
 
Huang, Y., (2010). “Debating China's Economic Growth: The Beijing Consensus or the 
Washington Consensus”, Academy of Management Perspectives, 24(2), pp. 31-47.  
 
Huang, Y. (2016). “Understanding China's Belt & Road initiative: motivation, framework and 
assessment”. China Economic Review, 40(September), pp. 314-321. 
 
Huliaras, A., & Magliveras, K., (2008). “In Search of a Policy: EU and US Reactions to the 
Growing Chinese Presence in Africa”, European Foreign Affairs Review, 13(3), pp. 399-420.  
 
Jenkins, R., & Edwards, C., (2006). “The economic impacts of China and India on sub-
Saharan Africa”, Journal of Asian Economics, 17, pp. 207-225.  
 
Jerven, M. (2011). “The quest for the African dummy: Explaining African post-colonial 
economic performance revisited”, Journal of International Development, 23(2), pp. 288-307. 
 
Ji, B., (2010). “China’s economic recovery and the China model”, Journal of Chinese 
Economic and Business Studies, 8(3), pp. 215-226.  
 
Jones, O. D., (2012). “Chinese Weapons Fuel African Conflicts, Despite Sanctions”, 
http://bigthink.com/ideafeed/chinese-weapons-fuel-african-conflicts-despite-sanctions 
(Accessed: 01/08/2014).  
 
Kamwanga, J., & Koyi, G., (2009, November). “The impact of China-Africa Investment 
relations: the case of Zambia”, African Economic Research Consortium. 
http://dspace.africaportal.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/32409/1/Zambiainvestmentrelations.
pdf?1 (Accessed: 02/08/2014). 
  
Kaplinsky, R., & Messner, D., (2008). “Introduction: The impact of the Asian drivers on the 
developing world”, World Development, 36(2), pp. 197–209. 
 
Kaplinsky, R., & Morris, M., (2009). “Chinese FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa: Engaging with 
Large Dragons”, The European Journal of Development Research, 21(4), pp. 551-569. 
25 
 
 
Kayizzi-Mugerwa, S., (2001). “Globalisation, Growth and Income Inequality: The African 
Experience”, Working Paper No. 186, OECD Development Centre, Paris.  
 
Khanna, P., (2014). “New BRICS Bank a Building Block of Alternative World Order”, New 
Perspectives Quarterly, 31(4), pp. 46-48. 
 
Kiggundu, M. N., (2008). “A Profile of China‘s Outward Foreign Direct Investment to 
Africa”, Proceedings of the American Society of Business and Behavioral Sciences, 15, (1), 
pp. 130-144. 
 
Kitissou, M. (Ed.) (2007). Africa in China’s global strategy. London: Adonis and Abbey. 
 
Kodila-Tedika, O. & Agbor A., J., (2014). “Religious Diversity and Economic Development 
in Sub-Saharan Africa: So Far So Good”, Journal of African Development,16(1), pp. 99-117. 
 
Kodila-Tedika, O., Asongu, S. A., & Kayembe, J. M., (2016). “Middle Class in Africa: 
Determinants and Consequences”, International Economic Journal, 30(4), pp. 527-549.  
 
Kolstad, I., & Wiig, A., (2011). “Better the Devil You Know? Chinese Foreign Direct 
Investment in Africa”, Journal of African Business, 12(2), 31-50. 
 
Kragelund, P., (2009). “Part of the Disease Or Part of the Cure?” Chinese Investments in the 
Zambian Mining and Construction Sectors”, European Journal of Development Research, 
21(4), pp. 644-661. 
 
Kramon, E., (2009). “Vote Buying and Turnout in Kenya’s 2002 Elections”, University of 
California, Los Angeles, http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/wgape/papers/17_Kramon.pdf 
(Accessed: 04/03/2015).  
 
Kuo, S. C. Y., (2012). “Beijing's Understanding of African Security: Context and 
Limitations”, African Security, 5(1), pp. 24-43.  
 
Kuznets, S., (1955). “Economic Growth and Income Inequality”, American Economic Review, 
45, pp. 1-28. 
 
Lall, S., Weiss, J., & Oikawa, H., (2005). “China’s Competitive Threat to Latin America: An 
Analysis for 1990-2002”, Oxford Development Studies, 33(2), pp. 163-194.  
 
Lalountas, D.A., Manolas, G.A., & Vavouras, I.S., (2011), “Corruption, globalization and 
development: How are these three phenomena related?”, Journal of Policy Modeling, 33, 
pp.636-648. 
 
Large, D., (2008). “China & the Contradictions of ‘Non-interference’ in Sudan”, Review of 
African Political Economy, 35(115), pp. 93-106. 
 
Lewis, A., (1955). Theory of Economic Growth. Milton Park: Routledge. 
 
Lin, J. Y., (2015). “The Washington Consensus Revisited A New Structural Economics 
Perspective”, Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 18(2), pp. 96-113.  
26 
 
 
Lin, X., & Farrell, C., (2013). “The Internationalization Strategies of Chinese State and 
Private State Enterprises in Africa”, Journal of African Business, 14(2), pp.  85-95.  
 
Lin, J., & Monga, C., (2011). “Growth Identification and Facilitation : The Role of the 
State in the Dynamics of Structural Change”. Development Policy Review, 29(3), pp. 264-90. 
 
Looney, R. E., (2013). “The Omani and the Bahraini Paths to Development: Rare and 
Contrasting Oil-Based Economic Success Stories”, In Achieving Development Success: 
Strategies and Lessons from the Developing World, ed. Fosu, A., Oxford University Press.  
 
Lucas, R. E., (1993) “Making a miracle”, Econometrica, 61(2), pp. 251-272. 
 
Lwoga, E. T., σgulube, P., & Stilwell, C., (2010). “Managing indigenous knowledge for 
sustainable agricultural development in developing countries: Knowledge management 
approaches in the social context”, The International Information & Library Review, 42(3), pp. 
172-185. 
 
Lyman, Princeton N. (2005, 21 July). “China’s Rising Role in Africa”, Council on  Foreign 
Relations, http://www.cfr.org/china/chinas-rising-role-africa/p8436 (Accessed: 02/01/2014). 
 
Mawdsley, E. (2008). “Fu Manchu versus Dr Livingstone in the Dark Continent? How British 
broadsheet newspapers represent China, Africa and the West”, Political Geography, 27, pp. 
509-529. 
 
McCormick, D., (2008). “China & India as Africa's New Donors: The Impact of Aid on 
Development”, Review of African Political Economy, 35(115), pp. 73-92. 
 
Menell, N., (2010). “China and Africa: The New Neocolonialism?” Helen Suzman 
Foundation.  
 
Mkandawire, T., (2004). ‘Can Africa have Development States?’. In Simon Bromley et al. 
(eds), Making the International: Economic Interdependence and Political Order. London: 
Pluto Press(in association with Open University). 
 
Mkandawire, T., (2015). “Neopatrimonialism and the Political Economy of Economic 
Performance in Africa: Critical Reflections”, World Politics, 67(3): 563-612. 
 
Mohan, G., (2013). “Beyond the Enclave: Towards a Critical Political Economy of China and 
Africa”, Development and Change, 44(6), pp. 1255–1272.  
 
Mohan, G., & Lampert, B., (2010). “Negotiating China: Reinserting African agency into 
China-Africa relations”, African Affairs, 112(446), pp. 92-110.  
 
Mohan, G., & Tan-Mullins, M., (2009). “Chinese Migrants in Africa as New Agents of 
Development? An Analytical Framework”, European Journal of Development Research, 
21(4), pp. 588-605. 
 
Mohan, G., & Power, M., (2008). “New African Choices? The Politics of Chinese 
Engagement”, Review of African Political Economy, 35(115), pp. 23-42.  
27 
 
 
Monga, C., (2014). “The False Economics of Pre-Conditions: Policymaking in the African 
Context”, Journal of African Development, 16(2), pp. 121-140. 
 
Moreira, M., M., (2007). “Fear of China: Is There a Future for Manufacturing in Latin 
America?”, World Development, 35(3), pp. 355-376.  
 
Moyo, D., (2013). “Is China a new idol for developing countries”, TED Talks, New Ideas 
Every day, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Q2aznfmcYU (Accessed: 07/05/2014).  
 
Moyo, D. (2009). Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There is Another Way for 
Africa. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.  
 
Moyo, D., (2018). Edge of Chaos: Why Democracy Is Failing to Deliver Economic Growth 
and How To Fix It, New York: Basic Books. 
 
Muneku, A., & Koyi, G., (2008). “The Social Economic Impact of Asian FDI in Zambia”, 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Lusaka. 
 
Munemo, J., (2013). “Examining Imports of Capital Goods From China as a Channel for 
Technology Transfer and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Journal of African Business, 14(2), 
pp. 106-116.  
 
Ndjio, B., (2009). “ ‘Shanghai Beauties’ and African Desires: Migration, Trade and Chinese 
Prostitution in Cameroon”, European Journal of Development Research, 21(4), pp. 606-621. 
  
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2013). “The Entrapment of African within the Global Colonial 
Matrices of Power: Eurocentrism, Coloniality and Deimperialieation in the Twenty-first 
century”, Journal of Developing Societies, 29(4), pp. 331-353. 
 
Nijs, A.,  (2008, November). “Chinese model of development suits 21st century”, Xinhua 
News Agency (accessed on: 16/08/2012). http://www.china.org.cn/business/news/2008-
11/07/content_16728807_2.htm  
 
Norman, A., & Stiglitz, J., (2012). ‘African Development Prospects and Possibilities. In 
E. Aryeetey et al. (eds), The Oxford Companion to the Economics of Africa. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
North, D., (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge 
and New York : Cambridge University Press. 
 
Nunn, N., (2008). “The Long-Term Effects of Africa’s Slave Trades”, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 123(1), pp. 139-176.  
 
Nunn, N., (2009). “The importance of history for economic development”, Annual Review of 
Economics, 1(1), pp. 65-92. 
 
Nunn, N., & Puga, G., (2012). “Ruggedness: The blessing of bad geography in Africa”. 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 94(4), pp. 20-36. 
 
28 
 
Obeng-Odoom, F. (2013). “Africa’s Failed Economic Development Trajectory: A Critique”, 
African Review of Economics and Finance, 4(2), pp. 151-175. 
 
Ortmann, S., (2012). “The ‘Beijing consensus’ and the ‘Singapore model’: unmasking the 
myth of an alternative authoritarian state-capitalist model”, Journal of Chinese Economic and 
Business Studies, 10(4), pp. 337-359. 
 
Osei, B., & Mubiru, A. M., (2010, July). “Chinese Trade and Investment Activities in Africa”, 
African Development Bank’s Policy Brief, 1 (4), pp. 1-12.  
 
Ovadia, J. S., (2013). “Accumulation with or without dispossession? A ‘both/and’ approach to 
China in Africa with reference to Angola”, Review of African Political Economy, 40(136), pp. 
233-250.  
 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (1980). Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic 
Development of Africa. Addis Ababa: OAU. 
OAU (2001). The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). Addis Ababa: OAU. 
 
Piketty, T., (2014). “Capital in the Twenty First Century”, Harvard University Press.  
 
Raseroka, K., (2008). “Information transformation Africa: Indigenous knowledge – Securing 
space in the knowledge society”, The International Information and Library Review, 40, pp. 
243-250. 
 
Rodrik, D., (2008). One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions and Economic 
Growth. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Sanfilippo, M., (2010). “Chinese FDI to Africa: What Is the Nexus with Foreign Economic 
Cooperation?”, African Development Review, 22(1), pp. 599-614.  
 
Schiere, R., (2010). “Building Complementarities in African between Different Development 
Cooperation Modalities of Traditional Development Partners and China”, African 
Development Review, 22(1), pp. 615-628. 
 
Schiere, R., & Walkenhorst, P., (2010). “Introduction: China’s Increasing Engagement in 
Africa: Towards Stronger Trade, Investment and Development Cooperation”, African 
Development Review, 22(1), pp. 559-561.  
 
Sen, A. K., (1999). “Democracy as a Universal Value”, Journal of Democracy, 10(3), pp. 3-
17.  
 
Sobukwe, R.,  (1959). “Robert Sobukwe Inugaural Speech, April 1959”,  South African 
History Online. http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/robert-sobukwe-inaugural-speech-april-
1959 (Accessed: 07/08/2014).  
 
Stiglitz, J., & Lin, J., (eds.), (2013). The Industrial Policy Revolution I: The Role of 
Government Beyond Ideology. New York, Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Stiglitz, J., Lin, J., & Monga , C., (2013a). ‘The Rejuvenation of Industrial Policy’, 
Policy Research Working Paper 6628. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
29 
 
 
Stiglitz, J., Lin, J.,  Monga , C., & Patel, E., (2013b). “Industrial Policy in the 
African Context”. Policy Research Working Paper 6633. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 
Taylor, I., (2006). “China’s oil diplomacy in Africa”, International Affairs, 82(5), pp. 937-
959.  
 
Taylor, I., (2007). “Governance in Africa and Sino-Africa Relations: Contradictions or 
Confluence?”, Politics, 27(3), pp. 139-146.  
 
Tchamyou, S. V., (2017). “The Role of Knowledge Economy in African Business”, Journal 
of the Knowledge Economy, 8(4), pp. 1189-1228. 
 
Tchamyou, V. S., (2019a). “Education, Lifelong learning, Inequality and Financial access: 
Evidence from African countries”. Contemporary Social Science. DOI: 
10.1080/21582041.2018.1433314.  
 
Tchamyou, V. S., (2019b). “The Role of Information Sharing in Modulating the Effect of 
Financial Access on Inequality”. Journal of African Business, 20(3), pp. 317-338.   
 
Tchamyou, V.S., Erreygers, G., & Cassimon, D., (2019). “Inequality, ICT and Financial 
Access in Africa”, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 139(February), pp. 169- 
184. 
 
Tull, D. M., (2006). “China’s engagement in Africa: scope, significance and consequences”, 
The Journal of Modern African Studies, 44(3), pp. 459-479. 
 
Tuomi, K., (2011). “The Role of the Investment Climate and Tax Incentives in the Foreign 
DirectInvestment Decision: Evidence from South Africa”, Journal of African Business, 12(1), 
pp.133-147. 
 
Power, R., (2008). “What Does the Rise of China Do for Industrialisation in Sub-Saharan 
Africa?”, Review of African Political Economy, 35(115), pp. 7-22. 
 
Power, M., & Mohan, G., (2010). “Towards a Critical Geopolitics of China's Engagement 
with African Development”, Geopolitics and Development, 15(3), pp. 462-495.  
 
Renard, M. F., (2011, May), “China’s trade and FDI in Africa”, African Development Bank 
Working Paper No. 126.  
 
Robinson, D. A., (2009). “Hearts, Minds and Wallets: Lessons from China’s Growing 
Relationship with Africa”, Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences, 1(3), 
pp. 861-869. 
 
Taylor, I., (2006). “China’s oil diplomacy in Africa”, International Affairs, 82(5), pp. 937-
959.  
 
Taylor, I., (2007). “Governance in Africa and Sino-Africa Relations: Contradictions or 
Confluence?”, Politics, 27(3), pp. 139-146. 
 
30 
 
Thoburn, J.,  (2013). “Vietnam as a Role Model for Development”, In Achieving Development 
Success: Strategies and Lessons from the Developing World, ed. Fosu, A., Oxford University 
Press.  
 
Tull, D. M., (2006). “China’s engagement in Africa: scope, significance and consequences”, 
The Journal of Modern African Studies, 44(3), pp. 459-479. 
 
United Nations (2010, January). “Foreign land purchases for agriculture: what impact on 
sustainable development?”, Sustainable Development and Innovation Briefs  Issue  No. 8.  
 
UNCTAD (2005). Economic Development in Africa. Rethinking the Role of Foreign Direct 
Investment, Geneva. 
 
Villoria, N., (2009). “China's Growth and the Agricultural Exports of Sub-Saharan Southern 
Africa”, European Journal of Development Research, 21(4), pp. 531-550. 
 
Wang, L., & Zheng, J., (2010). “China and the changing landscape of the world economy”, 
Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, 8(3), pp. 203-214.  
 
Wang, L., & Zheng, J., (2012). “China’s rise as a new paradigm in the world economy: 
preliminaries”, Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, 10(4), pp. 301-312. 
 
Wei, P., (2007, October). “The Chinese Model of Development”, Center for Chinese and 
Global Affairs, Peking University.  
 
Wei, W. X., (2013). “Special Issue: Chinese Trade and Investment in Africa”, Journal of 
African Business, 14(2), pp. 72-74.  
 
Wei, Y., & Wang, C., (2009), “Understanding China’s international economic integration”, 
Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies,7(4), pp. 401-408. 
 
Wissenbach, U., (2009). “The EU’s Response to China’s Africa Safari: Can Triangular Co-
operation Match Needs?”, European Journal of Development Research, 21(4), pp. 21(4), pp. 
662-674.  
 
World Bank (2011). “Improving the Odds of Achieving the MDGs: Heterogeneity, Gaps and 
Challenges”. Global Monitoring Report 2011. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 
Wouterse, F., Deininger, K., Selod, H., Badiane, O., Swinnen, J., Von Braun, J., & Zilberman, 
 D., (2011). “Foreign Direct Investment in Land in West Africa: The Status Quo, Lessons 
 from Other Regions, Implications for Research”, West & Central Africa Office Thematic 
 Research Note 1.  
 
Wu, Z., & Cheng, E., (2010). “Poverty Alleviation in the People’s Republic of China: The 
Implications for Sino-African Cooperation in Poverty Reduction”, African Development 
Review, 22(1), pp. 629-643.  
 
Zhang J., Wei, W. X., & Liu, Z., (2013), “Strategic Entry and Determinants of Chinese 
Private Sector Enterprises in Africa”, Journal of African Business, 14(2), pp. 96-105.  
 
31 
 
Zhou, Q., (2005).  “Conflicts over Human Rights Between China and the US”, Human Rights 
Quarterly, 27(1), pp. 105-124.  
 
Zhu, Y., (2010). “Trade, capital flows and external balance: is China unique in two hundred 
years of globalization?”, Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies,8(1), pp. 1-22.  
 
 
 
